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The study is an empirical test of the effects of different categories of government
expenditure, revenue and deficits on economic growth in developing countries. It is
based on panel data of annual series over the last three decades for 103 countries, which
are further classified into low-income, high-income, mineral exports dependent, and
foreign aid dependent groups. Our findings suggest that the effects of the fiscal
variables on growth vary across these groups of countries. But broadly, capital
expenditure have been detrimental to growth, just as current expenditure on goods and
services, while expenditure on wages and salaries is growth-promoting. …/…
Keywords: fiscal policy, public finance, economic growth
JEL classification: O23, O40Also, functional expenditure on general administration and defense have retarded
growth while spending on education and, to some extent, transport and communications
sector are growth-friendly. Other economic and functional categories of spending
generally have mixed effects, which are sometimes statistically insignificant. Non-tax
revenue retards growth in only high-income and mineral exporting groups of countries.
Taxes on income and profits are growth-retarding, just as taxes on domestic goods and
services in all groups, except mineral exporting one. Taxes on international trade are
found to be growth-promoting in only the low-income and foreign aid dependent groups
of countries. Foreign grants promote growth in only the group of countries that heavily
depend on them while fiscal deficits, whether domestically or foreign financed, retard
growth.
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1 Introduction
Public expenditure accounted for over 25 percent of GDP in developing countries in the
last three decades (see Table 1). Thus, while public expenditure and revenue do not
capture the totality of public actions on the economy, they do account for the bulk of it.
Therefore, an understanding of how public actions can be better shaped in improving
the economy requires a knowledge of the direction and magnitude of the effects of
government expenditure and revenue on economic growth—the promotion of which has
always been a central objective of public finance.
For this reason, the role of public expenditure and their sources of finance on economic
growth has been attracting some attention in the literature, particularly since early
1990s. At the theoretical level, the direction of effects of expenditure and taxation has
been analyzed within both the neoclassical and endogenous growth frameworks, but
with neither a categorical consensus nor unanimous conclusion as to whether the
expenditure or taxation has unambiguous effect—whether positive or negative—on
transitional growth rate (in the case of neoclassical paradigm) or steady-state growth
path (within the endogenous growth approach). The ambiguity is even more pronounced
at the empirical level, as mixed results pervade the literature. As aptly concluded by
Agell et al.. (1997, p. 33), “...the theoretical and empirical evidence … is found to admit
no conclusion on whether the relation is positive, negative or non-existent”.
In an attempt to further narrow down the often conflicting empirical findings, efforts
later moved from an analysis of the effects of aggregate government spending and
revenue on economic growth to an examination of the effects of different categories of
spending and revenue so as to identify which of them can be labeled “productive” and
“unproductive”. Studies reported by Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Devarajan et al.
(1996) were among the earliest under this category, when viewed from a multi-country
and developing country perspective. But, even then, the lack of unanimity in the
findings has still existed. In part, this is probably due to differences in the composition
of countries sampled, as the effects of each item of government expenditure and revenue
on growth is likely to be conditioned by the context or environment in which it takes
place—e. g. whether it is in a low- or high-income country as well as whether it is in a
country that depends on “windfall” or “gratuitous” external sources of finance.
Following from the foregoing, the present study would try to shed further light on the
unresolved issues by focusing on different groups of developing countries, based on the
level of per capita income as well as on the degree of dependence of the budget on
external “windfall” and “gratuitous” sources of finance.1 It will also present a more
disaggregated analysis of the fiscal variables, and report an updated evidence from a
more comprehensive list of developing countries, as most of the existing studies have
1 The “windfall” external sources of finance in the budget is used here to mean dependence on revenue
from export of petroleum and other minerals while “gratuitous” external sources refer to the
proportion of expenditure financed through foreign grants. Strictly speaking, revenue from petroleum
and other minerals are not derived from exports as such but from production, whether exported or not,
in the form of royalties and profit tax.2
been based on developed country data sets.2 Annual panel data over 1970s to 1990s for
over 100 developing countries are employed in the study.
The remaining discussion is organized into 4 sections. The next section is on literature
review. In section 3, we spell out the rationale for the study, describe the model and
method of its estimation; and discuss the data employed. The empirical results are
presented in section 4 while section 5 is on summary and conclusion. An appendix
listing the countries covered is provided at the end of the text.
2 Brief literature review
At the theoretical level, neoclassical growth model of different shades have been used in
studying the effects of government expenditure and taxation on growth. A common
feature of all neoclassical models is that policies, fiscal or otherwise, can only affect the
level of income but not the steady state economic growth rate—which can only be
affected by the rate of technological change and population (or labor force) growth.
However, policies can affect the speed of transition from one steady state to another
and, hence, economic growth during the transition. So, assumption of the economy
being in transit from one steady-state to another has to be invoked for policies to be
relevant in determining growth rate—see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Temple
(1999). As reviewed in Easterly and Rebelo (1993), some—e.g. Sato (1967) and
Feldstein (1974)—used Solow’s (1956) version while others—like Judd (1985) and
Chamley (1986)—use the variant developed by Cass (1965) and Coopmans (1965).
More recently, however, the endogenous growth theory was developed by Romer
(1986), Lucas (1988) and others. Within this framework, polices can affect steady-state
growth rate and not just the growth rate during the transition from one steady-state to
another. Following this development, a number of studies—e.g. Barro (1990) and
Cashin (1995)—have tried to model the effects of government expenditure and taxes on
steady state growth.
Whether based on the neoclassical or endogenous growth framework, the prediction
emerging from many of the theoretical studies is that taxes on investment and income
hinder growth, particularly by reducing returns to (and, hence, accumulation of) capital.
Similarly, neutral or negative effects of government consumption expenditure and
positive effects of government investment expenditure have often been predicted
(Aschauer, 1989). But these outcomes depend on the assumptions made, as some other
studies utilizing a different set of assumptions do generate contrary predictions. The
prediction of the effects of fiscal deficits on growth is equally mixed, with negative
effects being applicable—within the context of infinite horizon models - when a higher
deficit today is assumed to be eliminated in future through taxes on income or
consumption. Alogoskoufis and Ploeg (1991) employed an overlapping generation
model to predict negative effects of fiscal deficits on savings rate and growth.
2 Annual panel data over 1970s to 1990s for over 103 developing countries (see the appendix) are
employed in the study—the most comprehensive of the limited number of studies based on developing
countries ever reported in the literature.3
At the empirical level, there have been a number of studies testing for the effects of
aggregate government spending (or, sometimes, government consumption and
investment spending separately considered) and taxation on growth. Some of these are
based on time series studies for a single country or a number of countries, as in Ram
(1986) and Roy and Vadlamudi (1998), while others employ cross-country data, as in
Barro (1991) and Odedokun (1997). Later, research efforts started to focus on an
examination of the effects of different economic and functional categories of
government expenditure as well as taxes on growth. A pioneering study along this line,
within a multi-country context, is that of Easterly and Rebelo (1993). Others, like that of
Devarajan et al. (1996), have since been reported and a most recent review of these is
presented in Folster and Henrekson (1999). Here, we only highlight two features of
these and earlier studies that have been reported. One of the features is the lack of
unanimity in the empirical findings, which often conflict with one another. For instance,
while some have identified growth-promoting effects of government investment
spending and selected functional categories of government spending (particularly, on
education and infrastructure), others have not. The second feature is the fewness of
studies based on developing countries among those that are being reported, as
researchers appear to be more at ease with the ready availability and high quality of
fiscal data for developed countries and because of other reasons that have been adduced
by Slemrod (1995) and Folster and Henrekson (1999). While some painstaking efforts
have actually been made to cover developing countries in a number of studies, as in
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Devarajan et al. (1996) and Odedokun (1997), the number
is relatively very few.
There is therefore the need to further shed light on the rather conflicting findings that
have so far been reported and also to give an exclusive coverage to the developing
countries. Accomplishing these are some of the objectives of the present study.
3 Rationale for the study, model specification and the data
3.1 Rationale for the study
The present study explores or tests for the effects of different categories of government
spending and revenue on economic growth in developing countries. It also explores
whether the developing country-wide effects vary between poorer and richer sub-groups
as well as whether the effects depend on the extent to which the government depends on
external “windfall” revenue from mineral exports and “gratuitous” receipts in the form
of grants.
The reason for the focus on developing countries has been adduced above—most of the
existing studies have been based on developed countries. As to the reason for the low-
and high-income groups, the effects of public finance on growth are often said to vary
according the level of per capita income. According to Folster and Henrekson (1999),
“Yet, studies that mix rich and poor countries do not necessarily represent a good test of
what theory predicts. Theoretical reasoning … point to an expectation of a negative
effect in countries where the size of the government sector exceeds a certain threshold.
In practice, we only observe very large public sectors in rich countries.”4
Concerning the separate treatments accorded the group of countries that depends on
external “windfall” revenue from mineral exports and other one that depend on
“gratuitous” receipts in the form of official transfers from abroad, the hypothesis to be
tested is whether dependence on these sources of revenue affects the efficiency of their
utilization. In these groups of countries, especially the group that depend heavily on
revenue and royalties derived from mineral exploitation, the size of government is
typically larger. Because of this and due to the fact that there are no specific tax payers
for such revenue sources, the government may be less accountable (to taxpayers that do
not really exist as such) and rent-seeking is likely to be more prevalent. It has been
posited, e. g. by Olson (1982), that this type of scenario tends to give rise to evolution of
organized interest groups that seek to promote legislations and government spending of
the type that retards growth. This type of situation can also promote corruption of the
type that leads to a diversion of government resources into unproductive uses.
3.2 Model specification
Whether based on the neoclassical or endogenous framework, the model often specified
for testing the effects of fiscal variables on growth broadly consists of a regression
equation with growth of per capita (or per labor) income as the dependent variable and a
set of conditioning variables as well as the fiscal variables of interest as the regressors.3
This same broad approach is adopted in the following study. Specifically, the equation
specified for estimation is of the following form:
gyit = aZit + bXit +u it ….. (1)
where: gy = growth rate of per capita real GDP;
Z = vector of conditioning variables;
X = vector of fiscal variables—either on the expenditure or revenue sides
of budget;
a = vector of parameters of the conditioning variables;
b = vector of parameters of the fiscal variables;
u = stochastic or random term; and
i, t subscripts = country and time subscripts, respectively—because of the
use of panel data.
3.2.1 Conditioning variables
These are not the variables whose parameter estimates are of immediate interest in the
study. But they are included so that the estimates of the fiscal variable parameters would
3 The interpretations of the resulting parameter estimates, however, differ. Under the neoclassical
setting, they represent transitional effects on growth rate that is moving from one steady-state to
another while, under the endogenous growth framework, they are interpreted as permanent effects on
the steady-state growth rates.5
be purged, as far as feasible, from the imprecision due to errors of omitted variables.
There is a wide array of such variables that have been postulated as determinants of
growth rates. Here, we limit our consideration to those adjudged to be important ones
which, at the same time, are unlikely to be highly correlated with fiscal policy variables.
One of these is the initial level of per capita income, which has always featured in
practically all previous studies and it is particularly favored by the neoclassical
approach. Higher-income economies are expected to grow more slowly than lower-
income ones and its parameter estimate should therefore be negative. We also include a
demographic variable—population dependency ratio. A high ratio is expected to deter
growth. A third one is the degree of openness of the economy (proxied by the ratio of
external trade to the GDP). We expect more open economies to record faster growth.
Finally, terms of trade growth is included as an indicator of external shock, the
expectation being that a country’s growth would be enhanced by a favorable terms of
trade movement.4
3.2.2 Fiscal variables
These are considered and tested for at various levels of aggregation but, in all cases,
government spending and their sources of finance do not feature simultaneously in a
particular equation to avoid what could amount to “double” counting. An overview of
these fiscal variables and their magnitudes are as shown in Table 1.
On the expenditure side, at the highest level of aggregation, total expenditure is
included. This is followed by a disaggregation into just two economic classifications,
current and capital expenditure and, then, a further disaggregation of the current
expenditure into five, viz: spending on goods and services; wages and salaries; interest
payments; subsidies and other transfers; and others (miscellaneous). In an alternative
specification, the total expenditure is disaggregated on a functional basis into seven, viz:
expenditure on general administration; defense; education; health; transport and
communications; other economic services; and others (miscellaneous).
On the other side of the budget, and at the highest level of aggregation, the total sources
of finance is simply disaggregated into just revenue (including grants) and deficits. This
is followed by a further disaggregation of the revenue into three—tax; non-tax and
grants. A further disaggregation is accomplished by breaking the tax revenue into
income and profits tax; domestic tax on goods and services; taxes on international trade;
and other (residual or miscellaneous) taxes. The only disaggregation of fiscal deficit
considered is domestic and foreign sources of deficit financing.
As to the expected direction of the effects of the above fiscal variables on economic
growth, the existing theories do not provide specific or definitive predictions. Hence, it
4 Unlike in some previous studies, we deliberately exclude the share of investment in GDP as a
conditioning variable. This is for a number of reasons. Investment includes a sizeable amount of
government investment spending. In addition, the channels through which fiscal policy actions can
influence growth are through changes in the rate of capital accumulation and efficiency of its
utilization. Inclusion of the share of investment spending in the equation means the first channel is
being controlled for, so that only the effects of fiscal variables on growth through the efficiency
channel can be identified.6
is safer to let them be data-determined or empirically observed. All we can do at this
stage is to review the reasons why some of them might have positive effects and others,
negative effects. Government spending of the type that corrects for the existence of
market failures (including provision of collective goods and goods with externalities as
well as goods that are typically produced through natural monopolies) are likely to
promote growth and this type of government spending are being referred to in the
literature as “productive” government expenditure. Similarly, if the income effect of
higher income taxes is opposite to and sufficiently very high to offset the (growth-
retarding) substitution effect on labor supply, then it too can promote growth. On the
other hand, government spending would be growth-retarding if it crowds out private
investment and private production; is bedeviled with rent-seeking and corruption; or the
requisite expenditure administrative capacity is lacking. In the same vein, taxation
would likely be detrimental to growth by creating a gap between gross and net returns
on saving and by being a disincentive to labor supply. This apart, poor tax
administration too can lead to the same result.7













Functional expenditure classif.—total 25.72 23.50 27.41 28.44 24.10
Gen. Administration 3.45 3.92 3.14 3.67 4.20
Defense 3.17 2.52 3.58 5.22 2.31
Education 3.46 3.20 3.65 3.67 3.42
Health 1.63 1.28 1.87 1.59 1.49
Transportation 1.85 1.96 1.79 1.82 2.39
Other economic services 3.96 4.12 3.90 4.37 4.11
Economic expenditure classif.
Goods & services 12.11 11.86 12.20 13.76 12.55
Wages & salaries 6.96 6.60 7.16 7.83 7.01
Interest payments 2.57 2.37 2.70 2.65 2.07
Subsidies & other current transfers 5.93 3.84 7.23 5.07 3.42
Capital expenditure 5.67 6.52 5.15 7.09 7.04
Current revenue & grants—total 23.30 19.90 25.98 27.28 20.81
Taxes on income and profits 5.15 4.16 5.96 7.33 3.67
Taxes on domestic goods & services 4.67 4.22 5.04 3.08 3.92
Taxes on international trade 4.33 4.85 3.96 3.28 5.60
Other taxes 2.24 0.99 3.22 1.67 0.97
Non-tax revenue 5.27 3.35 6.76 10.83 3.12
Grants 1.59 2.30 1.04 0.99 3.57
Sources of fiscal deficit financing—total 3.54 5.07 2.41 2.34 4.23
Domestic 1.77 2.64 1.11 1.41 3.02
Foreign 2.09 2.64 1.67 2.15 1.41
Notes: (i) The components may not add up to the aggregates because they generally have different
number of observations.
(ii) Deficits are represented by positive numbers.8
3.3 Estimation methodology
We are very conscious of the possibility of endogeneity of the right-hand variables, i.e.
reverse causation from economic growth to the fiscal variables and most of the
conditioning variables discussed above. Most of the previous empirical studies on the
subject have been faulted by subsequent reviewers on this ground. To cater for this, we
refrain from relating contemporaneous growth rate with the contemporaneous right-
hand variables. Instead, the initial values of the latter (i. e., during year t) are used as
regressors in the equation containing 5-year moving average growth rate (i. e. over year
t+1 to year t+5) as the dependent variable. The only exception is the terms of trade
growth, whose contemporaneous value (also measured as 5-year average growth rate) is
expected to be truly independent of contemporaneous economic growth.5
The study is based on time series (annual) data pooled across the countries into a panel.
To derive the estimates, we employ fixed-effect method of panel data estimation. This
technique caters for the existence of country-specific factors that do affect economic
growth by allowing the intercept term to vary across countries.
Also, due to the existence of large variation in the values of the regressors across
countries, we correct for possible existence of heteroscedasticity by employing White’s
(1980) homoscedasticity-consistent estimation technique.6
3.4 Measurement, scope and sources of the data
The fiscal variables are from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistical Yearbook
(GFSY). The terms of trade data are froman unpublished IMF source, just as the
information used in determining the proportion of merchandise exports accounted for by
petroleum. All other data are from the World Bank’s Economic Development Indicators
(electronic format).
The study is based on annual data over 1970 to 1998 for those developing countries for
which fiscal data are available form the GFSY for at least five consecutive years over
the period and the end-1998 population is not less than half a million.. They total 103
countries and their list is provided in the Appendix.
All the fiscal variables are expressed as ratios of GDP. Economic growth is the 5-year
moving average growth of real GDP per capita, exactly the same approach favored and
utilized by Devarajan et al. (1996, p. 322) “so as to eliminate short-term fluctuations
induced by shifts in public expenditure, and by choosing a moving average, we are able
to increase the number of time series observation in our panel data.” The same approach
is used in computing the terms of trade growth.
5 The 5-year moving average growth rate of each of the per capita GDP and terms of trade is computed
through the least-squares method.
6 The employment of moving average growth rate of per capita GDP as the dependent variable makes
the Durbin-Watson statistic to be much lower than the ideal value of 2. But, because of the panel data
employed, especially whereby the time series for most of the countries pooled are interrupted with
missing values, the use of DW statistic is hardly applicable in diagnosing serial correlation of the
residuals. Diagnosing the existence of serial correlation of residuals within the context of panel data is
still far from being perfectly resolved in econometric literature.9
3.5 Classification of countries
As already pointed out before, separate estimates are derived for all the 103 countries
combined as well as different classifications of these countries. One classification is on
the basis of per capita income, which is used to divide the countries into poor and rich
groups of developing countries. The real per capita income (at 1995 US $ ) cut-off used
for this purpose is $1,000. The other classification is based on the extent of revenue
from mineral (crude petroleum and metallic) exploitation - and, hence, mineral exports.
The countries regarded as belonging to this category are those having the sum of
petroleum and metallic mineral exports accounting for not less than 20 percent of total
merchandise exports. The third category is the countries that depend much on foreign
official transfers (grants) in financing the budget and a country is so classified if the
official transfers account for not less than 20 percent of total government expenditure.7
The rationale for the above classifications has been discussed earlier.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Broad view of the results
The estimates of the economic growth equations are presented below in Tables 2 to 9. In
all cases, the explanatory power of the equations is only modest, judging by the modest
values of the adjusted R
2. This is not unexpected and neither is it uncommon, given the
heterogeneity of the countries covered.
The estimates of the conditioning variables are explicitly reported in only Tables 2 and
3. While they are included in deriving the results reported in Tables 4 to 9, their
estimates are not reported there for brevity and to save space, since these estimates are
found to be essentially the same as those reported in Tables 2 and 3. It can be seen from
these Tables 2 and 3 that the estimates of the conditioning variables are broadly in line
with expectation. Particularly, the initial level of per capita income enters all equations
with negative and statistically significant coefficients. The same is true for the
population age dependency ratio, except in the equation for substantial aid receiving
group of countries where it is not statistically significant. Also, the terms of trade
growth enters all equations with the expected positive coefficient that is statistically
significant except for low-income and sizeable foreign aid receiving groups of
countries. It is only the openness of economy regressor that does not enter the equations
with statistical significance.
Concerning the effects of the aggregate fiscal variables on growth, these are very clearly
portrayed in Tables 2 and 3, from where it can be seen that higher share of total
government spending in GDP has statistically significant negative coefficients in the
equations for the groups of countries considered. The same applies to each of total
revenue and fiscal deficit in relation to GDP. The only exception is the group of
countries that have received substantial foreign transfers, where neither total
7 Under each of these classifications, a country can belong into a category only during a part of the
entire period. For instance, if the per capita real income crossed the $1,000 threshold in 1990, it would
be classified as a poor country before 1990 and as a rich country thereafter.10
government spending nor total revenue (including grants) is found to have any
statistically significant effect on growth and while fiscal deficit is found to have
negative statistically significant effect on growth there, both the magnitude and
statistical significance of the effect are less than for other groups of countries. This
finding suggests that high total expenditure, total revenue and fiscal deficits all have
growth-retarding effects, except (in the case of total expenditure and revenue) in
countries that have depended much on foreign transfers. Further lights will be shed on
this finding through a consideration below of the disaggregated government spending
and revenue.








































































0.176 0.111 0.244 0.333 0.112
No. of data points 1176 491 685 203 264
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.11


















































































0.182 0.117 0.253 0.336 0.141
No. of data points 1342 554 788 238 292
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) Fiscal deficit is entered positively, and surplus negatively.
4.2 Effects of various economic categories of government expenditure on growth
As discussed earlier, the first level of disaggregation, on economic basis, of total
government spending is to break it into just current and capital expenditure. The results
of estimating the equation containing these two expenditure variables are as reported in
Table 4 below. Next, the current expenditure is further disaggregated into five—
expenditure on goods and services; wages and salaries; interest payments; subsidies and
transfers; and other (miscellaneous). Including these, together with the capital
expenditure, as the fiscal variables in the estimated equation produces the results
r e p o r t e di nT a b l e5b e l o w .
Table 4 results show that both current and capital expenditure retard economic growth
in the equation for all the countries combine, just as in high-income and especially
mineral exporting countries. In the equations for these groups of countries, the
coefficients of the current and capital expenditure are negative and statistically
significant. The same applies to current spending, but not capital expenditure, in the
low-income countries. But no significant effect is recorded for the group of countries12
that are large receivers of foreign grants. A probable explanation of the observed
negative effect of capital expenditure on growth is that, apart from the possibility of it
crowding-out private investment, it is more vulnerable or prone to rent-seeking and
graft than current spending, the result of which would be to reduce the productivity of
the expenditure. It can also be due to the long gestation period required for public
investment projects to yield output. That it is not found to have negative effects in the
aid-receiving countries could be due to project-tying of aid and other monitoring
devices that the foreign donors often put in place to reduce injudicious capital spending
by the receiving governments. Concerning explanation of the just noted effects of
current spending, further insights into this are provided by examining the effects of its
various components as discussed next paragraphs.
Based on Table 5 results, the following are the observed effects of different components
of current spending on growth: current spending on goods and services has detrimental
effects on growth in all groups of countries, as its coefficients are negative and
statistically significant in all cases. The reverse is the case for current expenditure on
wages are salary, the coefficients of which is positive in all equations and exhibit
statistical significance except in the equation for mineral exporting group of countries.
Concerning current spending on interest payments, while its coefficients are negative in
all equations, it is only in the equation for low-income countries where it is statistically
significant to some extent. It is also only in this same group of countries where current
spending on subsidies and transfers is found to have fairly significant effect on
growth—but, this time, a positive effect. Other (miscellaneous) current expenditure is
found to have no significant effect on growth, except in the high-income group of
countries where significant positive effect is recorded.
A probable reason for the observed detrimental effects on economic growth of current
spending on goods and services and the simultaneous positive effects of current
spending on wages and salaries is also in terms of the rent-seeking syndrome. Corrupt
practices and other rent-seeking vices are likely to be more characteristic of supply of
goods and services to the government sector (particularly, in typical cases where
government procurement as well as custody or storage procedures are weak) than in the
case of payment of wages and salaries.8 Current spending on interest payments appear
to have significantly hindered economic growth of only the poorest countries probably
because they are the ones that feel the pinch of the burden more, especially interest
payments on external debts. Concerning subsidies and other current transfers that is
found to promote growth of substantial aid-receiving countries, probably such transfers
are better targeted and more needed in such countries. Other (miscellaneous) current
spending assumes a sizeable dimension only in the high-income countries and this
probably explains why it has a significant (positive) effect on growth in only this group
of countries.
8 For instance, payroll fraud (typically) by rank and file of civil servants might be less detrimental than
executive frauds that often characterize award of contracts for government projects and procurement
of goods and services.13







































0.185 0.132 0.242 0.321 0.109
No. of data points 1097 427 670 189 228
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) For brevity, estimates of the parameters of the controlling variables (viz: initial per capita
income level; openness of economy; terms of trade growth; and age dependency ratio) are not
reported – although their estimates are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3.14























































































0.218 0.168 0.283 0.435 0.124
No. of data points 978 372 606 164 189
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) For brevity, estimates of the parameters of the controlling variables (viz: initial per capita
income level; openness of economy; terms of trade growth; and age dependency ratio) are not
reported – although their estimates are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3.
4.3 Effects of various functional categories of government expenditure on growth
The alternative level of disaggregation of total government spending is to break it into
functional categories. As discussed previously, seven such categories are identified and
related to economic growth in this study. They are government spending on general
administration; defense; education; health; transport and communication; other
economic services; and other (miscellaneous). The estimates of the economic growth
equations where these fiscal variables feature as regressors are as reported in Table 6
below.
The results show that government expenditure on general administration retards growth
in all groups of countries, except in mineral exporting countries where the positive
effect on growth is not statistically significant. In the same vein, defense spending is
found to retard growth in all group of countries except in the group of countries that are
sizeable foreign aid receivers—where the effect, though positive, is not statistically
significant. On the other hand, higher government spending on education is found to15
promote growth in all groups of the countries, with statistically insignificant positive
effect recorded only for mineral exporting group of countries. Health expenditure,
which is least in magnitude (see Table 1), is found not to promote growth in these
countries and, in fact, it is observed to retard growth in high-income group of countries.
Expenditure on transport and communication is found to have positive effects on growth
only in high-income and sizeable foreign aid receiving groups of countries but no
discernable effect in the low-income and mineral exporting countries. High government
spending on other economic services is found to hinder growth substantially in high-
income countries but without any significant or discernable effects on growth in other
groups of countries. The other or miscellaneous functional expenditure category does
not appear to have any effect on growth except in mineral exporting group of countries
where negative effect, which is statistically significant only at the margin, is recorded.
That higher spending on general administration retards growth could be due to the fact
such spending is not often determined by economic consideration and may also be
devoid of financial prudence. While defense spending can conceptually promote growth
by creating security necessary for economic activities, the observed negative effect—
which is in conformity with the findings generally reported in the empirical literature—
suggests that defense spending in these countries have generally not often been directed
towards this end. The non-negative effect recorded by aid-receiving group of countries
could be due to some donor-induced restraints on possibly reckless and aggressive
defense spending. The observed growth-promoting effect of education spending shows
the importance of human capital development to economic growth of developing
countries. That no such growth-promoting effect is observed in the case of health
expenditure could be due to a number of reasons. Probably, health spending is more
vulnerable to rent-seeking than education spending. Also, health spending is typically
undertaken by lower-levels of government to a greater extent than education spending
and our data covers only central government health spending—which might focus more
on tertiary health care (which would have less impact on human capital formation).
Expenditure on transportation and communication is expected to strengthen the physical
infrastructures that are supposed to facilitate production and this explains its observed
growth-promoting effect in the high-income and sizeable aid receiving groups of
countries. However, this explanation is weakened by the fact that the positive effect is
not observed in low-income and mineral exporting countries. Concerning spending on
other economic services, one would have expected it to promote growth but this is not
in line with the results reported in the Table, from where it can be seen that it even
retards growth in high-income group of countries. This apparent paradox could be due
to the fact that such spending is not often focused; the economic projects are not being
targeted or scrutinized on the basis of economic criteria; and is dominated by political
consideration as well as prone to rent-seeking. That the other (miscellaneous)
expenditure does not have significant effects on growth could be due to its
miscellaneous nature and the small magnitudes of the amounts involved.16































































































0.225 0.136 0.293 0.388 0.213
No. of data points 1016 406 610 198 226
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) For brevity, estimates of the parameters of the controlling variables (viz: initial per capita
income level; openness of economy; terms of trade growth; and age dependency ratio) are not
reported – although their estimates are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3.
4.4 Effects of current revenue and grants on growth
The observed negative effects of current revenue (including grants), as noted in sub-
section 4.1, are analyzed further by disaggregating the revenue into tax revenue, non-tax
revenue and grants. The results of estimating the economic growth equation where these
feature as the fiscal variables (with deficit being the other fiscal variable) are as
presented in Table 7 below. A further disaggregation is effected by breaking down tax
revenue into four—taxes on income and profits; domestic taxes on goods and services;
taxes on international trade; and other (miscellaneous). The results of this
disaggregation are reported in Table 8.17
From Table 7, it can be seen that tax revenue has significant growth-retarding effect in
high-income countries and insignificant effects on growth in other groups of countries.
High non-tax revenue, on the other hand, is seen to hinder growth in high-income and
mineral exporting countries while high level of grants significantly retards growth in
only mineral exporting countries. Positive, though mild, effect is recorded in those
countries that are substantial receivers of grants (Tables 7 and especially Table 8).
Further insights on the effects of tax revenue are provided by examining its further
disaggregation, as discussed next paragraph. Concerning the observed negative effect of
non-tax revenue in only high-income and mineral exporting groups of countries, this
could be due to the fact that it is only in these two groups where the amounts collected
of non-tax revenue accounts for a high fraction of the budget and also of the GDP (see
Table 1).9 The amounts involved are relatively small in other groups of countries to
make much impact on growth. The mild positive effect of grants in those countries that
receive substantial aid could be due to the effect of monitoring, by donors, of their
disbursements. That the same grants retard growth in mineral exporting countries might
be because these countries typically do not receive much of the routine aid and the little
they receive is often dictated mainly by political considerations, making the utilization
to be hardly amenable to oversight or monitoring by the donors.
The results presented in Table 8 show that high income tax ratio has statistically
significant negative effects on growth in all groups of countries, except in the group that
depend substantially on foreign aid, where the negative effect is not significant.
Similarly, high taxes (in relation to GDP) on domestic goods and services too retard
growth in all groups of countries except in mineral exporting group where it does not
have a negative effect. On the other hand, taxes on international trade are observed to
have positive effects on growth in low-income as well as substantial foreign aid
receiving groups of countries while marginally significant negative effect is recorded in
mineral exporting group and insignificant effect in high-income group. The other
(miscellaneous) taxes are found to have insignificant effect on growth in all cases
except in mineral exporting group of countries where positive effect is recorded.
That high income (and profit) tax ratio is found to hinder growth is not unexpected, as it
is often regarded as a deterrent to supply of labor, efforts and enterprise. This is in
addition to the usually high costs of collection and administration that bedevils this type
of tax in most developing countries. Also, that its negative effect is statistically
insignificant in the aid-receiving group of countries could be due to the fact that income
tax ratio is lowest there (see Table 1). The negative effect of high domestic taxes on
goods and services could be due to the evolving nature of the culture and system of this
tax (which might have made it cumbersome and its administration inefficient) in many
developing countries—e.g. standard value-added tax system hardly existed, during most
of the years covered by the study, in many of the countries sampled. It is hoped that,
with the passage of time, the countries would perfect the system and make it growth-
conducive. That mineral exporting countries depend less on this type of tax (see
9 Mineral exporters depend a lot on this class of revenue (as royalties) and, since most of them are
classified under high-income group, this also explains why the latter group too records high ratio of
non-tax revenue.18
Table 1) probably explains while its effect is insignificant there. Concerning the
observed growth-promoting effect of taxes on international trade in low-income and
aid-receiving groups of countries, this is probably due to the fact that these countries
have depended over a relatively long time on this source of revenue more than any other
(see Table 1) and have therefore attained some degree of perfection in its collection and
administration. Again, the relative statistical insignificance of its effect on growth in
high-income and mineral exporting groups of countries could be because these countries
depend less on it, as compared with other countries, in financing the budget (see
Table 1).
Table 7: Empirical results on the effects of tax revenue, non-tax revenue,






















































0.179 0.110 0.252 0.392 0.139
No. of data points 1339 552 787 238 292
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) For brevity, estimates of the parameters of the controlling variables (viz: initial per capita
income level; openness of economy; terms of trade growth; and age dependency ratio) are not
reported—although their estimates are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3.19
























































































0.201 0.157 0.256 0.394 0.292
No. of data points 1337 550 787 238 0.190
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) For brevity, estimates of the parameters of the controlling variables (viz: initial per capita
income level; openness of economy; terms of trade growth; and age dependency ratio) are not
reported—although their estimates are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3.
4.5 Effects of domestic and foreign sources of deficit financing on growth
It is noted above in sub-section 4.1 that high deficit financing is detrimental to growth.
Here, we only wish to explore whether both or just one of the domestic and foreign
sources is growth-retarding and this is accomplished by breaking the total deficits into
these two categories in our growth equation. The results of this are as presented below
in Table 9.
These results show that it is both components that have significant negative relationship
with growth and this is so in all groups of countries, except in aid-receiving group
where the negative effect is not significant.20


























































0.188 0.117 0.277 0.471 0.141
No. of data points 1160 494 666 199 254
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is 5-year forward moving average growth rate of per capita real GDP.
(ii) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 10%; 5%; and 1% levels if its t-value exceeds (in absolute
sense) 1.6; 2.0; and 2.5.
(iii) For brevity, estimates of the parameters of the controlling variables (viz: initial per capita
income level; openness of economy; terms of trade growth; and age dependency ratio) are not
reported—although their estimates are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3.
5 Summary and conclusion
Public finance can be regarded as the centerpiece of public actions or policies directed
at promoting economic growth and such policies would be facilitated through a
knowledge of the direction of the effects of various components of government
spending and revenue. To this end, a number of theoretical and empirical attempts have
been made to shed lights on this. However, such attempts, in addition to being limited in
scope, have failed to provide unanimous predictions or reach definitive conclusions.
The study reported in this paper is an attempt to rectify this and shed an additional light
on the issue.
In particular, we focus exclusively on developing countries, sampling annual data over
the last three decades over 100 countries and carry out separate analyses for different
groups of countries—poor; rich; foreign aid dependent; and mineral export dependent
groups of countries. Effects of very disaggregated functional and economic components
of government spending on economic growth were tested for. The same is done for
revenue, especially taxes and, to a limited extent, deficits. The highlights of the results
of estimating our model are as follows:
(i) High level of capital expenditure is found to hinder economic growth in high-
income and mineral exporting groups of countries and have no discernable effects in21
low-income and foreign aid dependent groups. Possible explanations for this are
provided in terms of rent-seeking phenomenon; crowding-out of private investment; and
long gestation period needed for government capital spending to translate into higher
output.
(ii) High level of overall current government spending is detrimental to growth,
except in foreign aid dependent group of countries where no discernable or significant
effect on growth is recorded. A disaggregation of this overall current spending into
various economic categories shows that high level of current expenditure on goods and
services is detrimental to growth in all groups of countries while the reverse is the case
for high level of expenditure on wages and salaries. Other categories of current
spending have mixed and often insignificant effects, depending on the group of country
under consideration. Again, a possible explanation of this observation is in terms of
rent-seeking related phenomenon—to which expenditure on goods and services are
more prone to, vis-à-vis others, especially expenditure on wages and salaries.
(iii) Concerning the various functional categories of total spending, a high level of
spending on education and, to a limited extent, transport and communications is found
to be growth-friendly while high level of spending on general administration as well as
on defense is found to have the opposite effect. Other functional categories of spending
have mixed and often insignificant effects, depending on the group of country under
consideration.
(iv) High level of non-tax revenue is found to deter economic growth in high-income
and especially mineral exporting countries—where (in the form of royalties) it accounts
for a high ratio of GDP. It has insignificant effects in other groups of countries. High
level of overall tax, on the other hand, significantly retards growth in only high-income
group of countries. But when the total tax is further disaggregated, it is found that a high
level of taxes on income and profits retards growth—except, perhaps, in the foreign aid
dependent group of countries where the negative effect is not statistically significant.
This evidence is in line with most previous findings. Also, a high level of taxes on
domestic goods and services has similar growth-retarding effect, except in the mineral
exporting group of countries where statistically insignificant effect is recorded. This
could be because, during most of the three decades covered by the study, many
developing countries were yet to put in place modern system of taxes on domestic goods
and services (e. g. VAT) and effective arrangement for administering whatever system
they might have. On the other hand, taxes on international trade are found to be
positively related to growth in foreign aid dependent and low-income groups of
countries—but not in other groups of countries where statistically insignificant effects
are recorded. This is probably because poor countries, by being highly dependent on
this form of tax in the past, have attained some degree of efficiency in its collection and
administration vis-à-vis other forms of tax.
(v) Grants are positively and significantly related to growth in foreign aid
dependent group of countries, while the reverse is the case in mineral exporting and, to
some extent, high-income groups of countries. It has no discernable effect in low-
income countries. A possible explanation is in terms of the efforts by donors to monitor
the utilization of their disbursements in those countries that depend much on their
donations.22
(vii) A high level of fiscal deficit is found to have retarded growth and this is the case
whether domestically or externally financed.
But some caveat have to be noted here in connection with our findings. In particular,
given the limited guidance provided by theory, our “explanations” of the findings, as
provided in the text, are hardly nothing more than conjectures. More important, our
analysis is based on public finance statistics that must have been compiled and
classified under different methodologies, despite the fact that we obtained them from
the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook. This is not to talk of missing
values and lack of continuity in the series for each country. In addition, as rightly
pointed out by Easterly and Rebello (1993, p. 421) in a similar study, “GFS, which is
our main source of fiscal data suffers from two relevant shortcomings: (i) it includes
only central government activities and thus excludes local government and public
enterprises … and (ii) for some years and some countries the GFS statistics are based on
budget data.”
However, having said that, it is hoped that such caveats are not so serious to invalidate
some of the findings of this study. Many of such findings are expected to be an eye-
opener as to how public finances can be improved to enhance growth. For instance, that
government capital spending has been negatively related to growth in these countries in
the past is not necessarily a basis for discontinuation with government investment
spending. It only implies that measures should be taken to make government capital
spending to be productive. The same interpretation applies to other findings.23
Appendix: list of sampled countries
1. Albania 36. Guatemala 71. Oman
2. Algeria 37. Guinea 72. Pakistan
3. Argentina 38. Guinea Bissau 73. Panama
4. Bahamas 39. Guyana 74. Papua New Guinea
5. Bahrain 40. Haiti 75. Paraguay
6. Bangladesh 41. Honduras 76. Peru
7. Barbados 42. Hungary 77. Philippines
8. Benin 43. India 78. Poland
9. Bhutan 44. Indonesia 79. Romania
10. Bolivia 45. Iran 80. Rwanda
11. Botswana 46. Israel 81. Senegal
12. Brazil 47. Jamaica 82. Seychelles
13. Bulgaria 48. Jordan 83. Sierra Leone
14. Burkina Faso 49. Kenya 84. Singapore
15. Burundi 50. Korea 85. Somalia
16. Cameroon 51. Kuwait 86. South Africa
17. Chad 52. Lebanon 87. Sri Lanka
18. Chile 53. Lesotho 88. Sudan
19. China (Mainland) 54. Liberia 89. Swaziland
20. Colombia 55. Madagascar 90. Syria
21. Congo (Demo. Rep.) 56. Malawi 91. Tanzania
22. Congo (Rep.) 57. Malaysia 92. Thailand
23. Costa Rica 58. Mali 93. Togo
24. Cote d’Ivoire 59. Malta 94. Trinidad and Tobago
25. Cyprus 60. Mauritania 95. Tunisia
26. Czech 61. Mauritius 96. Turkey
27. Dominican Rep. 62. Mexico 97. Uganda
28. Ecuador 63. Mongolia 98. United Arab Emirates
29. Egypt 64. Morocco 99. Uruguay
30. El Salvador 65. Myanmar 100. Venezuela
31. Ethiopia 66. Namibia 101. Yemen, Rep.
32. Fiji 67. Nepal 102. Zambia
33. Gabon 68. Nicaragua 103. Zimbabwe
34. Gambia 69. Niger
35. Ghana 70. Nigeria24
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